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 The Prime Directive 
 
Douglas G. Baird∗ & Robert K. Rasmussen∗ 
 
Abstract 
Agency costs dominate academic thinking about corporate governance. The 
central challenge is to devise legal rules to align the interests of the managers 
(the agents) with those of the shareholders (the principals). This preoccupa-
tion is misplaced. Whether it is finding a baby-sitter or a dean, the challenge 
of hiring the right person dwarfs the challenge of aligning that person’s incen-
tives. The central task for corporate governance—its Prime Directive—.0is to 
ensure that the right person is running the business. In this essay, we suggest 
that the challenge of aligning the managers’ incentives has been drastically 
overstated and the way in which legal rules affect hiring (and firing) decisions 
has been too often ignored.  
The current preoccupation with executive compensation runs the risk of in-
ducing the board to worry more about the details of the employment contract 
rather than selecting the best person in the first instance. More important, 
the law can play an important role ensuring bad managers are fired. The 
market for corporate control does this, but debt contracts also play a crucial 
role, one that has been largely neglected. Covenants in debt contracts can in-
sure that underperforming managers are called to task. Indeed, they may be 
as important as the market for corporate control. 
 
 
Al Dunlap firmly embraced the standard academic norm of running the 
company for the benefit of the shareholders. When he became the CEO at 
Scott Paper, he told the world, “Scott should be making money for its share-
holders. It’s a sin to lose money, a mortal sin.”1 Putting his words into action, 
he signed a compensation contract that tied his own wealth to the value of 
the company. As he had done in the past, his relentless focus on cutting costs 
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presented at a symposium at the University of Cincinnati Law School and will be published 
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1 STUART C. GILSON, CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE STUD-
IES IN BANKRUPTCIES, BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS 353 (2001). 
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brought millions to both Scott Paper’s shareholders and himself. In his 
twenty months at Scott Paper, the share price more than tripled. Flushed 
with success, he published a book that touted his efforts at Scott Paper and at 
other companies.2 
When he was hired the next year at Sunbeam, its stock leaped 49% on the 
announcement. Dunlap immediately applied the methods that he has used so 
effectively elsewhere. Payrolls were slashed, and demands on productivity 
were ratcheted up. “Chainsaw Al” was in charge. But something went wrong. 
When he looked for a buyer for Sunbeam, none materialized. Dunlap adopted 
a new strategy. He bought three companies, adding over a billion and a half 
dollars of debt to Sunbeam. Within a year, Sunbeam’s stock had lost 70% of 
its value, and Dunlap was shown the door. Sunbeam came to terms with the 
debt accumulated under Dunlap’s watch only when it filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection. 
Dunlap’s career presents a challenge to the standard model of corporate 
law. Since Berle and Means,3 the corporate law debate has focused on the 
separation of ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling launched the past 
three decades of corporate governance literature when they recast the prob-
lem in terms of agency costs.4 Investors desire legal rules and contracts that 
ameliorate the agency problem that inevitably arises in a world of managers 
who cannot be perfectly monitored and who do not enjoy all the benefits or 
incur all the costs of the decisions they make. Legal rules should aim to make 
it easier for investors to ensure that the incentives of managers are aligned 
with their own.  
                                                     
2 See ALBERT J. DUNLAP WITH BOB ANDELMAN, MEAN BUSINESS: HOW I SAVE BAD COMPA-
NIES AND MAKE GOOD COMPANIES GREAT (1996). 
3 See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
4 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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Left to their own devices, managers become too comfortable. The more in-
sulated the CEO and her team become, the less they take the interests of the 
investors to heart. They will shirk. They will empire-build. They will forgo 
value-enhancing projects that may increase the risk that they will be fired. 
They will consume excessive perks. The job of corporate law is to minimize 
these agency costs. This theme has dominated the corporate law debate for 
decades, both in the popular press and academic literature.  
None of this, however, explains Al Dunlap. Dunlap lampooned corpora-
tions who touted their commitment to workers, customers, and the world at 
large. There was a fixed star for Dunlap, and that was increasing returns to 
shareholders. All of his contracts had a substantial equity component. He 
even insisted that the directors of Sunbeam be paid in stock rather than cash. 
Al Dunlap failed at Sunbeam; but his failure cannot be attributed to the ills 
that are said to infect today’s corporate governance.5  
Dunlap’s career exposes the disconnect at the heart of today’s corporate 
governance debate. Corporate governance focuses on devising the right set of 
rules that provide optimal incentives to managers. For anyone who has hired 
someone to perform any job, focusing obsessively on the compensation con-
tracts seems decidedly odd. The primary problem one faces is finding the 
right person for the job, not worrying about agency costs. An executive who 
has spent her career controlling costs may be the right person to hire for a 
mature business facing competition on price but would be a disaster for a 
newly public corporation whose primary task is to build out its operations. 
Businesses have differing needs, both from each other and at different times 
in their life cycles. 
CEO candidates are not fungible, nor is there a single metric by which one 
can assess the talent of the contenders. The problem is not coaxing the opti-
                                                     
5 One cannot chalk up Dunlap’s failure as a good ex ante decision that simply did not pan 
out. Dunlap, after his career at Sunbeam, was damaged goods that no other company would 
touch. 
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mal amount of effort from the person selected; rather, the problem is select-
ing the person whose skills are best suited to addressing the challenges that 
the company faces. To be sure, companies want to make sure that they pay 
their managers in the right coin and they want to monitor managers’ per-
formance. But shirking is rarely the problem. Those who become CEOs of 
businesses, executive directors of not-for-profits, presidents of universities, or 
managing partners of law firms are Type AAA personalities, completely ad-
dicted to their jobs to the exclusion of everything else in their lives. More im-
portant, when companies hire the wrong managers or when the people they 
hire cease to be effective, the problem is rarely the result of the type of con-
tract companies have put in place or the type of oversight they have exer-
cised. Changing the contract or the oversight rarely does any good. It is the 
personnel that needs to be changed, not the terms of the contract.  
Nothing is subtle about the idea that once a company hires the right per-
son for the job, everything else is a matter of detail. Finding the right baby-
sitter or the right dean dwarfs the problem of writing their contracts. When a 
coach has too many losing seasons in a row, no one talks about a better con-
tract or better supervision. The only question is whether the time has come to 
fire him. From this perspective, the dominance of the agency cost problem is 
inexplicable. 
In this paper, we confront this state of affairs. Dispersed investors cannot 
act in concert. They rely on a board of directors, particularly the independent 
directors, to monitor the managers. The board of directors is the locus of cor-
porate governance. To understand the role that legal rules play in this envi-
ronment, we need to ask what directors do and how legal rules can affect 
their decisions. We argue that the challenge of hiring and firing managers is 
the single most important job that directors face.  
While this job is by far the most important one that a board faces, the fail-
ure of the corporate law debate to focus upon this issue is in part quite expli-
cable. Courts should not be in the business of second-guessing a board’s hir-
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ing decisions. Knowing which person to hire to lead the business requires 
judgment, and the law can do nothing to give good judgment to those who do 
not have it. Nevertheless, the law has a much larger effect at the margin 
than commonly thought. In particular, the way in which legal rules regulate 
a lender’s exercise of her rights under a loan covenant can make dramatic—
and largely neglected—differences in the ability of investors to replace man-
agers. Boards, for understandable reasons, may be too slow in realizing that 
managers have to go. Lenders tend to suffer less from this bias. A robust vi-
sion of corporate governance brings lenders within its ambit. When this is 
done, it becomes apparent that debates about lender liability actions, the tort 
of deepening insolvency, or debtor-in-possession financing need to focus on 
the way in which such legal rules affect the control investors have over their 
managers. Indeed, these debates too often couple control with liability. 
Lender control is thought to impose a cost on other investors. The debate is 
over its magnitude and the ability of the law to constrain it. Neglected en-
tirely are the benefits of lender control, the way creditors can take actions 
that work to the benefit of all the investors.  
I. Boards and the Agency Problem 
In the United States, investors in publicly traded businesses delegate de-
cisionmaking to the board of directors. Widely dispersed shareholders have 
neither the time nor the expertise needed for effective oversight. The powers 
of the board of directors are plenary. In theory, boards of directors can do al-
most anything. Although they cannot put their hands in the till, they can 
vote for any action that they see fit, save for the few actions that require 
shareholder approval. They can redirect the assets of the business any way 
they deem appropriate. If the board of Wal-Mart decided that it should cease 
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being a retailer and become a manufacturer of personal computers, it has, in 
theory, the power to steer the company down this path.6 
In fact, however, a board’s range of action is quite constrained. The direc-
tors are part-timers. They have day jobs. They become directors by being suc-
cessful in their own careers. Directors come from the ranks of current and 
former CEOs of other companies, bankers and lawyers.7 These directors do 
not curtail their other activities once they join the board. Because they are 
part-timers, thare are real limits on how much time they can invest in med-
dling in the affairs of the corporation. Although directors have the power on 
paper to be dictators, the way in which their jobs are structured ensures that 
they will not hold the reins very tightly.  
Because boards are largely self-perpetuating and can be captured by the 
full-time managers, academics have long looked to the market for corporate 
control as a way to ensure that boards act effectively or are replaced when 
they do not.8 Poor managers leave money on the table, and those with an ea-
gle eye for gains will swoop in, buy the corporation, and install new execu-
tives. Much of the work on corporate governance advocates changing legal 
rules to enhance the market for corporate control. Staggered boards should be 
difficult to install and easy to remove. The same with poison pills. State ac-
tion designed to stymie takeover efforts should be resisted. Revlon duties that 
                                                     
6 Although commentators are engaged in an ongoing debate over whether shareholders 
should have more power than they currently do, even the staunchest advocates of share-
holder decisionmaking would leave the power to run the business in the board. See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006). 
7 Recent evidence suggests that, after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, cur-
rent CEOs are more reticent to serve on boards, and this has led to a corresponding rise in 
the appointment of retired corporate leaders. 
8 Henry Manne pioneered the concept of the “market for corporate control.” See Henry G. 
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-14 (1965). 
Lucian Bebchuk has strenuously argued that voting rules should be altered to make it easier 
for shareholders to replace directors. Yet even if one made it easier in theory for shareholders 
to select directors, it is still unclear whether in practice they would avail themselves of that 
right on a frequent basis. See Bebchuk, supra note 6. 
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limit the discretion of boards to favor the managers when a business is in 
play should be given a broad swath.9  
But apart from ensuring that legal rules facilitate the market for corpo-
rate control, what else should the law try to do? It is all well and good to 
make it easier for shareholders to mount proxy contests and to actively par-
ticipate in corporate governance, but apart from facilitating the market for 
corporate control how do we want the law to steer the decisionmaking of di-
rectors? To improve the way in which the board governs the business, we 
need to ask what the board should be doing in the first instance.  
We should not expect too much. Members of the board are involved only 
part time. Outside directors, by definition, lack intimate familiarity with the 
conditions in which the firm finds itself. They have neither the time nor the 
expertise to make fundamental decisions about the future course of the busi-
ness. It would be a mistake, however, to think a need exists for directors to 
make such changes. Business models are quite durable. Successful busi-
nesses are those that execute their business plans better than their competi-
tion, not the ones that refashion them as the seasons change. 
Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg looked at forty-five corporations that be-
gan as venture-backed start ups and matured into public companies.10 When 
we think of start-up ventures, we are tempted to imagine that they possess 
enormous flexibility, much more so than an established business. The direc-
tors here are not part-timers but rather tend to be professional directors. The 
venture capitalist that funds them does not have the collective action prob-
lems that plague shareholders of public companies. Moreover, the funding in-
vestors have a representative on the board. For the investors on the board, 
                                                     
9 Again, the literature here is extensive. It ranges from what is the appropriate role of the 
board here, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991), to whether the board should make this decision or the shareholders, 
see Bebchuk, supra note 6. 
10 See Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Stromberg, What are Firms? Evolution 
from Birth to Public Companies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11581, 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=795265. 
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this is part of their job. Venture capitalist make money by having the compa-
nies in which they invest hit home runs. With such a focused monitor and 
cheerleader, one could hypothesize that the business could morph along any 
dimension as the entrepreneur searches for her niche. 
In fact, Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg report that the one durable attrib-
ute of successful startups is the core idea. If anything, public companies are 
even more unlikely to change direction quickly. Assets are deployed and 
strategies developed. The cost of switching these assets to other uses proba-
bly exceeds the cost of simply starting a new venture from scratch. Major 
changes in the direction of the business—such as Time Warner’s merger with 
AOL—can backfire. To be sure, one can tweak a business plan around the 
margins. Firms constantly expand and contract their operations. Also, busi-
nesses can evolve over time. General Electric (GE) no longer gets the bulk of 
its revenues from the electricity industry.11 Yet the kudos for GE’s ability to 
reinvent itself go to the succession of CEOs able to ascertain what was 
needed at the time. It was not the directors who instituted the vision that the 
business needed to be transformed.  
If directors are not to revamp the business plan, what is their task? The 
most modest vision of directors is that they act as cheerleaders. They help 
cement relationships with key constituents.12 They provide a sounding board 
for ideas, and provide feedback to the executive.13 If the board’s best use is as 
a sympathetic sounding board, legal rules that induce directors to police the 
managers more closely may backfire. An executive may be less inclined to 
hide bad news from a group whose mission is to provide candid advice about 
                                                     
11 Indeed, General Electric is that rare company that seems able to reinvent itself. Even 
here, however, change is gradual and is instigated by the CEO and not by the Board.  
12 See JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZA-
TIONS 167, 167-68 (1978). 
13 See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971). 
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difficult situations than one that is supposed to pass judgment.14 Under this 
vision, greater shareholder democracy and using legal levers to reshape di-
rector decisionmaking is a mistake. Once board members represent specific 
constituencies, they cease to be sounding boards and counselors and instead 
become lobbyists. 
The best way to ensure a high-quality board that is able to fill this func-
tion may be to make it self-perpetuating. The governance of many not-for-
profit institutions works in precisely this way, and many of these institu-
tions—including our great universities—are exceedingly long-lived. The fel-
lows of Harvard College were in place for over two hundred and fifty years 
before GE or IBM was formed.  
But one can advance a different view of what directors are supposed to do. 
Directors might most usefully serve not as counselors, but as monitors. Under 
this view, the responsibility of directors, or at least the one that the law can 
influence, concerns basic monitoring duties. This role is easy to understand. 
For much of history, the only managers of businesses were themselves mem-
bers of the family that owned the business.15 A family might send one of its 
own abroad as a partner, not with any expectation that the son would be 
much of an entrepreneur, but only with the hope that he would ensure that 
their foreign partner did not steal from them. Modern capitalism cannot exist 
in such an environment.16 We need to be sure that managers do not line their 
own pockets. A corporate governance regime that does this much already 
                                                     
14 For an examination of the tension between the advising and monitoring functions of the 
board and how it affects the incentives of CEOs to disclose information to the directors, see 
Reneé B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. (2007). 
15 On the rise of the corporate form, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard 
Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006). 
16 Indeed, someone whose exposure to capitalism is limited in this way is likely to misun-
derstand it in rather fundamental ways. For an example of the work of someone who failed to 
understand that keeping your partner from stealing from you and being an entrepreneur 
were two different things, see KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 
(1848). For a discussion of Engels’s failings as an entrepreneur, see George R. Boyer, The 
Historical Background of the Communist Manifesto, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998). 
10 / Baird & Rasmussen 
does a lot, and arguably such an institution exists in a regime of self-
perpetuating board of status-conscious part-time directors. 
For outside directors who care about their reputations, even a small risk 
of legal liability in a world in which there are relatively effective courts and 
reliable auditors, may be enough to keep managers in line. They may give 
managers slack, but they will not tolerate dishonesty. They will not sacrifice 
their own reputations for the sake of a golfing buddy. The outside directors of 
Enron, as bad as they may have been, fired Andrew Fastow the second they 
learned he was stealing from the company. Their failure arose from compla-
cency and their inability to understand what was going on, not their unwill-
ingness to take action when they discovered bad acts. The kind of person who 
becomes a director of a publicly traded company can be counted upon to put a 
stop to dishonesty, fraud, and illegal conduct—provided they find out about 
it. Fraud and mischief usually arise because the board never suspects it. 
From this perspective, legal rules should not so much enhance the ability 
of shareholders to pick directors, but make it easier for information to come 
to the directors and easier for them to assess. Some recent corporate reforms 
work in this fashion. Whistle-blowing rules aim to ensure that information 
cannot be hidden from the board. Auditors must be genuinely independent 
and can be required to report directly to an audit committee. One of the least 
problematic features of the new rules is the New York Stock Exchange’s re-
quirement that the independent directors to meet outside the presence of the 
managers. In the absence of a legal rule, the outside directors might not be 
able to have such a meeting. A good manager might see an executive session 
as a signal that the board has no confidence in him. The board might, on that 
account, choose not to have such meetings. A bad pooling equilibrium can 
arise, one in which such meetings do not occur, even though they would be to 
the investors’ benefit. By requiring such executive sessions, the meetings’ oc-
currence does not itself signal any information. 
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But one has to be careful not to expect that this is a margin that can be 
pushed very far. Part-time directors cannot be full-time police officers. To be 
sure, one might convert the job of director into a more full-time job and put 
greater responsibilities on the director for looking after the business, but at 
this point, the director herself becomes a manager who is invested in her job 
with the business. The basic premise—that her reputation as a whole mat-
ters more than her position with a particular corporation—is compromised 
when she becomes too invested in any one enterprise. She becomes subject to 
the same agency problems that she is supposed to prevent.17  
Apart from ensuring a flow of reliable information (both to the directors 
and the market as a whole) and that neither the directors nor the managers 
interfere with the market for corporate control, what else should the directors 
be doing? In particular, what can legal rules do to make the directors more 
effective than they would otherwise be? The most recent corporate govern-
ance literature answers this question by analyzing executive compensation.  
The most vocal of the current critics of executive compensation schemes 
are Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. For them, the way in which executive 
compensation is set is badly in need of reform.18 The lavish pay that CEOs 
receive reflects CEO control over the compensation process.19 Even if the 
board is otherwise competent and dedicated, over time, the board is stacked 
with either the friends of the CEO or at least people to whom she did not ob-
                                                     
17 Indeed, things may be even worse. We see very few operations where day-to-day author-
ity is vested in a group rather than a single individual. The law should hesitate before it 
moves corporations toward a governance model that has yet to be adopted in virtually any 
setting. 
18 Setting of executive compensation has spawned an impressive body of work, both in the 
popular press and the legal and economic literatures. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s re-
cent book aggressively sets forth the argument that current levels of executive pay reflect 
CEOs’ capture of the compensation process. See LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
An excellent survey of the economic literature on executive compensation can be found in 
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485 (Or-
ley Ashenfelter & David Cord, eds. 1999). 
19 Id. 
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ject. Directors enjoy being directors. None of this leads directors to tolerate 
bad behavior, but they will give the CEO the benefit of the doubt. These fac-
tors lead to CEOs receiving more compensation than they would if the board 
engaged in hard-nosed negotiations. Legal rules can, in principle, correct for 
this bias. 
The SEC, for example, has recently enacted regulations designed to make 
executive compensation more transparent. As things now stand, not only are 
executives well compensated by any measure, but it is also often difficult for 
investors to pin down the exact remuneration they receive. Money can be 
funneled to managers in creative ways, such as increases to pensions, use of 
private jets, and other means. The goal of the new regulation is to make it 
easier for investors to ascertain precisely how much the CEO is receiving for 
her services. With such knowledge in hand, shareholders can attempt to 
shame those directors who lavish undeserved pay on poorly performing 
CEOs. 
The attention executive pay has received in the popular press is under-
standable. There is always a bit of prurient interest involved in learning how 
much someone makes. Who doesn’t read about the pay of corporate chieftains 
with a bit of envy? Also, the growth in executive pay has come at a time when 
many other pay packets are being squeezed. The growing differential be-
tween executive compensation and the compensation of the average worker 
sparks outrage.20 Whether legal rules should direct their principal attention 
to executive compensation, however, is a quite different matter.  
Disclosure will not necessarily curb executive compensation. As Ed 
Iacoubucci points out, mandatory disclosure may increase the level of execu-
tive compensation, even when one assumes that the board is bargaining hard 
                                                     
20 One sees the same understandable outrage in bankruptcy when senior executives re-
ceive incentive plans to induce them to stay with the company while at the same time ordi-
nary workers are asked to make substantial sacrifices. 
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with the CEO.21 There is a market for executives and the more that is known 
about how others are paid, the better bargains that prospective CEOs can 
strike. 
Moreover, the rise in executive compensation might not reflect agency 
costs run amok. Increases in compensation over the years may reflect in part 
an increase in the size of the corporation. The more assets a corporation de-
ploys, the more value a CEO can add. A talented manager who, relative to 
the next best available manager, can add even a modest one percent of value 
to a ten billion dollar company on an annual basis increases shareholder 
wealth by $100 million. There is a market for CEOs, and it is not surprising 
that as CEOs can add more value, they can demand higher wages.22 As 
Holmstrom and Kaplan point out, investors buying a basket of American cor-
porations during the time of the rapid increases in executive compensation 
received higher returns than investors who invested in other markets.23 We 
see generous executive compensation in environments in which the agency 
problems seem quite small.24 
To be sure, abuses undoubtedly exist, but this alone does not show CEO 
compensation should be a centerpiece of corporate governance. Legal rules 
that try to rein in excessive compensation can do more harm than good. The 
most obvious example is recent ill-conceived amendments to the Bankruptcy 
                                                     
21 See Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 489, 504-17 (1998). 
22 Indeed, even if a CEO of a multi-billion dollar corporation increases profits by a smaller 
percentage than a CEO of a hundred-million corporation, she may have created more abso-
lute wealth and thus be able to garner higher earnings. See generally Randall S. Thomas, 
Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1171, 1200-09 (2004) (explaining why increasing compensation may be part of a well-
functioning labor market). 
23 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: 
What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 9 (2003). 
24 To give only one example: the sophisticated group of private investors (including 
KK&R) that controls VNU were willing to pay $100 million to recruit a new CEO from Gen-
eral Electric, where he had been a long-time veteran. See Kathryn Kranhold & Joann S. Lub-
lin, $100 Million Helps Lure Away General Electric Veteran, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2006, at 
B1. 
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Code. These amendments forbid payments to an insider “for the purpose of 
inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s business” absent a number 
of specific findings, including a finding that the payment is “essential to re-
tention of the person because the individual has a bona fide job offer from an-
other business at the same or greater compensation.”25 This attempt to rein 
in compensation is simply silly. The very last thing a principal wants to have 
in place is a rule that induces her agents to spend time and energy looking for 
jobs elsewhere that pay more.  
To see something being done badly, however, is not to prove that it cannot 
be done sensibly. A last-minute bankruptcy amendment written by amateurs 
falls far short of proving it cannot be done. No one should take issue with the 
uncontroversial idea that legal rules can, in principle, curb excessive execu-
tive compensation. But focusing upon the problem of compensation misses 
the point. Antecedent to the question of compensation is the question of 
whether the current manager should be kept at all. Put differently, academic 
literature that focuses upon the optimal design of compensation contracts 
starts in the wrong place.26 If a manager is performing poorly, she should be 
fired, not subject to a pay cut. 
The obsession with the compensation contract flows from accepted princi-
pal/agent models in economics. In the standard model, the agent and the 
principal both seek to further their own well-being.27 The parties try to write 
a contract that maximizes their joint surplus by inducing the agent to put 
forth optimal effort. In the basic model, the optimal contract would pay the 
principal a fixed sum and give all of the residual due to effort to the agent. 
                                                     
25 11 U.S.C. §503(c). 
26 See, e.g., James Dow & Clara C. Raposo, CEO Compensation, Change, and Corporate 
Strategy, 60 J. FIN. 2701, 2703 (2005) (“We assume that change requires substantial effort 
from the CEO at the implementation stage, while business as usual requires much less. 
Hence, the reward for success must induce the CEO to put in enough effort to implement 
change . . . .”). 
27 For a description of the basic principal/agent model, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 577, 577–614 (1990). 
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Translated to the more complex world of the corporation, the stated goal of 
those focusing on executive compensation is to induce the executive to maxi-
mize the welfare of the shareholders.28 
The assumption is that, absent the correct contractual incentives, CEOs 
will tend to shirk. Shirking may take many forms. The CEO may not work as 
hard as she can. The CEO may also choose not to pursue risky projects; 
rather, she may play it safe so as not to risk being terminated. The CEO may 
look for projects that bring personal fame, say a sexy merger, rather than 
projects that increase shareholder wealth. Regardless of the outcome, the 
constant fear is that, absent a well-designed contract, the CEO will not put 
the interests of the shareholders first. 
Incentives, of course, matter, but focusing on them to the exclusion of all 
else is a mistake. Finding good managers is much harder and much more im-
portant than writing their contracts. Those hired to run major corporations 
are winners of a tournament.29 People compete for the top job, with the board 
of directors making the final selection.30 The prospect of the brass ring brings 
competitors to the tournament. Is it realistic to assume, however, that the 
winners of such a tournament are slackers-in-waiting? The person likely to 
do well in the tournament has a certain set of traits.31 Among these is the de-
sire to work hard. Other traits include overconfidence and a false sense of the 
ability to control outcomes. Those with these traits tend to survive. Are we 
                                                     
28 Of course, this goal flows from the proposition that the objective of corporate law should 
be to maximize shareholder value. Although this view is widespread, it is not universal. For 
those who espouse a more complicated role for the CEO, articulating the goal of executive 
compensation becomes more difficult. 
29 See Sherwin Rosen, Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments, 76 AM. ECON. 
REV. 701 (1986). 
30 To the extent that the board views the current CEO as successful and a good steward 
for the company, the board may defer to her opinion as to which candidate would be a suit-
able replacement. 
31 Don Langevoort has done pioneering work integrating insights from cognitive psychol-
ogy into the standard model of CEO selection. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature 
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001). 
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really worried that the winner of such a tournament lacks the incentive to 
work hard? 
Indeed, often contractual incentives are designed to channel energy rather 
than to induce effort in the first place. Consider, for example, the contract 
that the University of Colorado has given its most recent football coach. The 
coach will receive a $50,000 bonus if the students he coaches make sufficient 
academic progress. He will receive an additional $100,000 if he wins the con-
ference title and $250,000 if he wins the national title. Although academics 
and victories are both desirable goals, the contract signals their relative im-
portance. 
Similarly, one can tie a CEO’s compensation to any number of metrics, 
such as an increase in shareholder wealth, an increase in sales, or an in-
crease in market share. The goal of these milestones is not so much as to in-
duce optimal effort as they are to signal to the CEO where the board wants 
her efforts focused. Yet the contract goals here reflect the goals of the board. 
Even then, however, the goals are most reflected in the person that the board 
chooses to lead the business. A board intent upon cost-cutting commits itself 
to such a strategy by hiring Al Dunlap more completely than a board that 
hires a charismatic visionary and then builds cost-cutting incentives into her 
contract.  
II. The Prime Directive 
Much of the executive compensation debate assumes away the problems 
associated with finding the best managers. Again, the empirical evidence 
from the venture capital contract literature suggests that this is a mistake. 
Finding good managers is hard. The single biggest predictor of the success of 
a venture capital deal is the venture capitalist’s ex ante assessment of the 
strength of the initial management team. Moreover, this is what all of our 
experience tells us. The best teams may or may not get paid the most, but we 
do not think the best team owners are those who write the best employment 
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contracts. Looking at the compensation structure of the New York Philhar-
monic provides little insight into the quality of the performance. Daniel 
Barenboim and James Levine are the two highest paid conductors, but the 
contractual negotiations are over the amount of time they spend with the or-
chestra and the amount of time they spend doing something other than con-
ducting, such as fundraising. There is no need for incentives once they are on 
the podium. 
Similarly, New York Yankee fans were excited to get third baseman Alex 
Rodriguez. To be sure, everyone expected that the contract would contain in-
centives and bonuses, but the excitement came from the prospect of having 
his bat and glove, not from contract design.32 When law schools look to hire 
new faculty members, they are concerned with the hiring committee’s as-
sessment of the person’s ability to generate new insights and provide mean-
ingful instruction to the students, not whether the dean will put into place a 
contract that ensures best efforts. Regardless of the extent to which incentive 
contracts matter for academics,33 a school with the stronger faculty domi-
nates the one with the better contracts.  
When a business survives huge challenges and navigates difficult waters, 
it is going to be because Jack Welsh or Lou Gerstner is at the helm. From this 
perspective, one obligation of the board of directors of a corporation domi-
nates all others: ensuring that the right person serves as Chief Executive Of-
ficer. All of the other decisions that we associate with the board are second 
                                                     
32 Rodriguez, while with his prior team, the Texas Rangers, signed a 25-year contract that 
had a nominal value of more than half a billion dollars. [Was the 25-year contract with his 
prior team or his new team?] 
33 We are not arguing that incentives do not matter, even for legal academics. At least at 
one time, George Mason Law School seemed to adapt some of the executive compensation 
concepts to the academic setting when it offered a cash bonus to faculty members who placed 
their articles in “Top 10” legal journals. Even so, however, incentives achieve only so much. 
They can direct talent, but they cannot create it where none exists. In the case of George Ma-
son Law School, the purpose was not so much to get the faculty to work harder, but rather to 
steer them toward particular types of publications (i.e., legal rather than, for example, eco-
nomics journals). 
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order. The prime directive is to hire and, when necessary, fire the boss. Do 
this well, and most other concerns evaporate.  
The law barely affects the hiring decision, which may explain why this as-
pect of corporate governance has received little attention in the legal litera-
ture. The tepid duty of care sets the legal standard. Unless it is corrupt, a 
board is unlikely to run afoul of its commands when it hires a new leader for 
the business. The weakness of the duty-of-care constraint, however, is not be-
cause judges are courting managers. One cannot fashion a legal instruction to 
the directors, with attendant legal review, that would improve matters here. 
The instinctive hesitation of judges to second-guess business decisions seems 
well founded in this setting. 
Law can, however, make matters worse. If anything, the current concern 
with the compensation contract may be counter-productive for exactly this 
reason. Were directors to heed the prescriptions of the pundits, they may well 
spend more time fretting over the details of the CEO’s employment contract 
and not enough on ensuring they have the right person at the helm. More-
over, excessive scrutiny of compensation arrangements can lead directors to 
pick the candidate with more modest demands rather than more needed 
skills. 
The flip side of the hiring decision is the firing decision, and it is in this 
context where law matters. Even the best directors can make mistakes. The 
promising CEO may simply not be up to the task of running the operation. 
Also, situations can change. The CEO who had the skills necessary to meet 
the challenges for which she was hired may lack the ability to meet new chal-
lenges that arise. The responsibility for firing CEOs, like their hiring, is 
vested in the board. Although the duties may appear symmetrical, they are 
not. Here, the board may be prone to systematic error. A CEO will be able to 
insulate herself from meaningful review, and directors are in any event in-
clined to see the CEO in a positive light, either because they have picked her 
or because she has picked them. Capture of the board by a dominant CEO 
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has long been a concern of those who study corporations,34 and this is the 
context in which it matters the most. 
Michael Eisner’s highly visible ouster from Disney provides a telling ex-
ample. Hiring Eisner in the first instance was not a bad decision. To the con-
trary, he added enormous value to the company in his first ten years. He was 
well-paid, but the general view was that he deserved it.35 Nor was the prob-
lem that Eisner stopped working hard. The problem was that Eisner lost the 
team that brought him success in the first place and, after ten years, became 
the wrong person for the job. Seen ex post, to the extent that corporate gov-
ernance failed, Disney’s failure was that it did not fire him soon enough. 
In theory, it is easy to articulate the circumstances under which the board 
should cashier the CEO. The firing of a CEO is the exercise of a real option. 
The choice that the board faces is whether to exercise the option and fire the 
current manager or postpone the decision as it gets more information about 
the manager’s performance. Of course, there are substantial costs to changing 
a CEO. The search period takes time, a time during which period the com-
pany may lack direction. Also, senior executives may spend more effort in an 
attempt to secure the top job rather than performing their jobs. The possibil-
ity of frequent turnover also chills the ability to attract outsiders. Failed 
CEOs rarely get a second chance. To the extent that a CEO has built a re-
sume likely to generate future job offers, she is not likely to jump to a com-
pany with a reputation for quickly pulling the plug on the CEO. In other 
words, the optimal approach may be to promise a certain amount of slack to 
the CEO to land the most attractive candidate. 
                                                     
34 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 23 (“Directors have financial and nonfinancial 
incentives to favor, or at least get along with, executives.”); Langevoort, supra note 31, at 797 
(“The dominant view in corporate governance theory today is that heavy emphasis on team-
work and conflict-avoidance marks a board that has been captured by its CEO, an illusion of 
a governing body that acts largely as an elite private club with a rubber stamp.”). 
35 See, e.g., Muriel Reddy, Fairytale Comes True with a Kiss of Life for Disney, ADVER-
TISER/SUN. MAIL, May 14, 1987. 
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It is thus unclear how often we should expect executive turnover even if 
the board terminated CEOs in an optimal fashion. Yet there are many rea-
sons to think that boards will be too slow to pull the trigger. One such reason 
is the CEO’s capture of the board. In the standard account, the CEO is able to 
dominate the board. Over time, the board becomes a subset of her friends. 
She remains in place not so much because her performance is up to snuff, but 
rather because her friends appreciate her attributes. 
Yet one does not have to subscribe to the notion that CEOs dominate 
boards to realize that boards face a difficult task when it is time to fire a 
CEO. Crucial to assessing the CEO’s performance is information about how 
the company is running under her leadership. Much of the necessary infor-
mation goes beyond that which is required to be reported publicly. The board 
may lack the information necessary to take the correct measure of the CEO. 
The board by and large does not have its own source of information. It de-
pends in large measure on the CEO for information. The CEO, like most of 
us, wants to appear in a good light. She has the incentive to put the best spin 
on her accomplishments. Successful and promising projects get top billing; 
those that go awry receive scant mention. Indeed, some work suggests that 
people who do not see their own shortcomings have a competitive advantage 
in the tournament to become CEO. Thus, the CEO may not even recognize 
bad news, let alone report it to her superiors. 
The board may have its own blind spots as well. Commitment bias is a 
well-documented risk in many settings.36 The basic notion is that once an in-
dividual or group has made a decision, they are likely to overweight informa-
tion that suggests that their decision was correct and underweight informa-
tion that calls that decision into question. We are not perfect Bayesians.  
                                                     
36 See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commit-
ment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 22, 22-44 (1976). 
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It is relatively easy to see how this tendency can infect the board’s evalua-
tion of the CEO. Having selected her, they are more likely to overlook her 
stumbles.37 Even if the CEO has no role in selecting new directors, the old di-
rectors may be inclined toward candidates who view the CEO they selected 
favorably. The frequency with which CEOs come to dominate the board is an 
empirical question about which it is difficult to generate firm conclusions. Yet 
even a board that is not captured will have difficulty terminating an under-
performing executive. The limited time that board members have to spend on 
matters coupled with skewed information and various predictable biases all 
suggest that a CEO may stay on longer than is warranted.  
All in all, we should anticipate that boards hiring a CEO will be to slow to 
dump her when necessary. Seen from this perspective, the margin at which 
legal rules might be pressed the most may lie in this domain. In asking how 
to improve the rules of corporate governance, we might first focus on those 
that enhance the ability of directors to fire underperforming managers. For 
example, reforms that ensure a flow of information to the board may be use-
ful for exactly this reason. Merely forcing the directors to discuss the per-
formance of the CEO may bring benefits. A board that might never consider 
firing a CEO may think twice if it is forced to confront the issue and make an 
up-or-down judgment.  
In thinking how legal rules work in this environment, however, one 
should look beyond the conventional boundaries of corporate law. It focuses 
narrowly upon shareholders. Creditors are also investors in the business. In-
deed, the difference between creditors and shareholders is somewhat artifi-
cial. It has long been understood that the difference between the cash flow 
rights of debt and equity is entirely permeable. An equity-holder can enjoy 
the cash flow rights of a debt-holder with the right combination of puts and 
                                                     
37 The level of continuation bias may be affected by how united the board was in the first 
instance.  
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calls, and a debt holder can do the opposite.38 But so, too, with control rights. 
Law makes the initial assignment, but the parties are free to alter this ar-
rangement in any way they see fit. 
Creditors, of course, enjoy control rights only if they contract for them, 
which they routinely do. Private loan agreements contain elaborate cove-
nants.39 These covenants typically include limitations on liens, asset sales, 
debt, financial investments, distributions, as well as prohibitions on mergers, 
transactions with affiliates, and changes in business lines. As one would ex-
pect, the more creditors are likely to be residual owners, and the more they 
are able to act in concert, the more covenants they put in place. These cove-
nants do not prevent such transactions, but rather give the creditor a seat at 
the table and a voice in these decisions. Because creditors exercise a voice in 
corporate decisionmaking, it is worth exploring the role they play in dumping 
underperforming managers and the way that legal rules affect this role. 
III. Debt and Termination 
Private debt dramatically affects the dynamics of the firing decision.40 The 
disciplining role of debt is well known. A defining feature of a debt contract is 
that it requires the company to make fixed payments. Failure to make a re-
quired payment imperils the future of the company. While one can worry 
about the accuracy of accounting data, all understand that not paying money 
when it is due is not a good sign. Indeed, failing to make a payment often sig-
nals that a bankruptcy proceeding is not far off.41 
Viewing debt as an aspect of the primary feature of corporate governance 
sheds new light on old questions. The policing of debt investors is a topic that 
                                                     
38 See Hans R. Stoll, The Relationship Between Put and Call Option Prices, 24 J. FIN. 801, 
803 (1969). 
39 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1231–32 (2006).  
40 We detail the role of debt more extensively in Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 39. 
41 For example, the Dana Corporation filed for bankruptcy about one week after missing a 
required payment on its outstanding public debt. 
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rears its head in many guises. These problems will soon take center stage. 
Hedge funds pile on debt in their acquisitions. Corporate debt is cheap today, 
and everyone is buying. Companies will hit financial distress more quickly 
today than in the past. Those who were happy to take on debt will no doubt 
turn to the law in an attempt to hold the creditors at bay. By understanding 
the role that private debt plays, we can see why these attempts to place legal 
restrictions on the actions of debt holders should be viewed with suspicion. 
Yet debt plays another role as well, one that is too often overlooked. Pri-
vate debt contains a number of covenants. The effect of these covenants is to 
ensure that the private lender has control over many decisions once the busi-
ness becomes distressed. Asset sales, new projects and new incurring of debt 
all require the explicit blessing of the lenders. Most importantly, however, 
the lenders can force the ouster of the CEO. To be sure, the formal power to 
remove the CEO remains with the board. However, the bank can make it 
known that it has lost confidence in the current management. Default, the 
directors know, can spell the end of their tenure with the business. If the 
company does enter Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, little chance exists 
that the board of directors will remain intact even if the company emerges 
from bankruptcy. Directors, both as fiduciaries for the corporation and in 
their own interest, do not wish to see a default. The price of the lender’s 
agreeing not to call the loan can be the dismissal of the CEO. 
The crucial question is whether the banks exercise their power in a way 
that leads the board of directors to better decisionmaking. After all, the board 
of directors is charged with fiduciary duties that are designed to benefit the 
corporation. Lenders look after only themselves. They will push the board in 
ways that advance their own agendas, not anyone else’s. Banks, however, 
have information and incentives that may lead them to decisions that ad-
vance everyone’s interests. 
As to information, banks have better information than do directors. The 
documents that borrowers sign give banks access to all of the information 
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that the board has, and more. Banks can inspect their collateral. They can 
interview any member of the management team. They can be proactive. They 
do not have an agenda set by the CEO. Perhaps most importantly, they can 
observe the cash flows of the business on as frequent as a daily basis, some-
thing that is not feasible for part-timer directors. The directors may have an 
X-ray of the business, but the lender can get a CAT scan. 
It might seem that lenders would suffer from a bias much like that of the 
directors. When a corporation seeks to borrow money, competition is fierce. 
Lenders have an incentive to offer as attractive terms as they can and to in-
gratiate themselves with the current management team. Having shown faith 
by putting in hundreds of millions of dollars, why then do banks not suffer 
from some of the same pitfalls that affect boards? If boards are likely to re-
tain their chosen CEO for too long, why not lenders? 
Of course, the question is not whether lenders are immune from the same 
pitfalls. They very well may be. But lenders have a greater incentive to not 
make a mistake. Unlike the directors, lenders have invested a substantial 
amount of money in the company. Banks that routinely make bad loans do 
not survive in the market place.  
More importantly, banks have structures designed to prevent the biases 
that may plague boards. They have a special department for handling trou-
bled loans. This division of functions can be explained in part as repairing the 
cognitive bias that would otherwise result. The fate of the CEO lies not with 
the client partner whose compensation depends on how many loans she can 
close, but rather with the banker whose own compensation depends on how 
much she can recover from the troubled loan. She has no allegiance to the 
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CEO. For her, the bottom line is what the bank can salvage from the situa-
tion.42 
Maximizing the bank’s return does not necessarily maximize the value of 
the company. By the same token, maximizing the bank’s return does not nec-
essarily reduce the value of the company. Some decisions may benefit the 
bank and the company alike. To the extent that part of the problem is that 
the CEO has lost her way, both can profit from a new leader. A new CEO who 
puts matters aright increases both the value of the bank’s loan and the value 
of the company. 
To be sure, it is easy to conjure up situations where the interests of the 
bank and the interests of the company are opposed. Banks may favor too cau-
tious a strategy. Yet caution is not the concern with respect to the central is-
sue of corporate governance. The question of replacing the CEO comes with 
few of the biases that usually lead senior and junior investors in different di-
rections. To be sure, the bank will have a bias towards safe projects, and jun-
ior investors will favor risky ones. But in a world in which business plans are 
stable, these biases are not likely to affect the choice of a new leader.  
If a sale or a reorganization of the business is in prospect, such bias is 
even more remote, as the senior investor is even less likely to suffer from 
bias. A risk-neutral buyer will pay an amount that collapses all future possi-
bilities to their present value. In the event of a reorganization in which the 
senior investor receives equity in the business, her interests are again best 
served by choosing the path that maximizes long-term revenues.43 
                                                     
42 Recent changes in the loan syndication market and the secondary market for loans, 
changes that reduce (sometimes dramatically) a bank’s exposure to loans it makes, may put 
pressure on these functions. 
43 For those who fret that bankers have a culture that makes them overly cautious, one 
need only remember that many of today’s lenders are not traditional banks. Private hedge 
funds are on the prowl for investments that promise above market returns. Indeed, we see 
some hedge funds making loans comfortable in the expectation that, if things go wrong, they 
will own the company. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate 
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003). With the amount of liquidity in to-
day’s markets, it requires something of a leap of faith to posit that there are sophisticated 
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We should look at the way in which the law regulates corporate lenders 
from this perspective. Lender liability actions discipline banks that did not 
make their decisions in “good faith.”44 Equitable subordination in bankruptcy 
can penalize lenders who are deemed responsible for the collapse of the com-
pany.45 The tort of deepening insolvency threatens lenders who keep a strug-
gling company afloat in order to protect their own interests.46 Today, there 
are calls, especially in the bankruptcy community, for limiting the power of 
lenders.47 
The costs of aggressive regulation in this area strike us as higher than 
any potential benefits. Few are happy when a failed company pays lenders in 
full (or nearly so) and leaves nothing for the junior investors. Yet across the 
range of cases, control by lenders may be in the interests of all. The more that 
the lenders can play a disciplining role and have the de facto power to rid a 
business of underperforming managers, the less the need to worry that mem-
bers of the board do not have the stomach for it. For some corporations, the 
optimal arrangement may be to have a board that does not monitor the CEO 
but rather leaves that task to outsiders. Some corporations may do better 
with a board that provides strategic resources to the CEO and supports her 
projects enthusiastically. While this creates the risk of not seeing the faults of 
the CEO, the cost of this risk is capped by the ability of the lenders to engage 
in shock therapy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
investors such as modern lending institutions that continually take actions that fail to 
maximize the value of the investment. 
44 Creditors who cut square corners and act within the limits of their loan agreement are 
usually safe. See, e.g., Smith v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 
893 F.2d 693, 702 (5th Cir. 1990) (”[A] creditor is under no fiduciary obligation to its debtor 
or to other creditors of the debtor in the collection of its claim.” (quoting In re W.T. Grant Co., 
699 F.2d 599, 609 (2d Cir. 1983))). 
45 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939). 
46 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide 
Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 750–52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
47 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Creditor in Possession: Creditor 
Control of Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 21 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1, 2 (2003) (“The ex-
cuse . . . of remedial rights given secured creditors upon the occurrence of default, in effect, 
puts those creditors in control of the debtor/borrower.”). 
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We should not ask directors to do more than humanly possible. Mentoring, 
monitoring and disciplining are all important tasks, but that does not mean 
that a single group should necessarily attempt all three. Here, as elsewhere, 
there may be gains to specialization. The challenge of corporate law may not 
lie in finding the right set of rules so that shareholders can hire the right set 
of directors who then write the best employment contracts. The challenge is 
to ensure that the board pays attention to the prime directive―hire the best 
person. Yet this is an on-going obligation. Not all CEOs should be left to de-
cide their time for departure. When it is time for a CEO to go, the lender may 
be in the best position to deliver the news. 
Conclusion 
Any assessment of corporate law has to take place against the backdrop of 
the role the lenders play in corporate governance. Should lenders be liable if 
they continue to lend to a company in financial difficulty? Should they, on the 
other hand, be liable for not lending when the chips are down? Do they have 
obligations to creditors? Although corporate directors do have fiduciary duties 
to shareholders, these duties are minimal at best when it comes to the hiring 
decision. No reported case holds a director liable for hiring the wrong person. 
The law in any event cannot give good judgment to those who do not have it. 
But the firing decision may be different, and here we should be far more at-
tuned to the way the law affects the various levers of corporate control and 
the extent to which these levers advance the interests of all investors. 
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